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ABSTRACT
This paper aims at answering the following two questions in
privacy-preserving data analysis and publishing: What formal pri-
vacy guarantee (if any) does k-anonymization provide? How
to benefit from the adversary’s uncertainty about the data? We
have found that random sampling provides a connection that helps
answer these two questions, as sampling can create uncertainty.
The main result of the paper is that k-anonymization, when done
“safely”, and when preceded with a random sampling step, satisfies
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with reasonable parameters. This result
illustrates that “hiding in a crowd of k” indeed offers some privacy
guarantees. This result also suggests an alternative approach to out-
put perturbation for satisfying differential privacy: namely, adding
a random sampling step in the beginning and pruning results that
are too sensitive to change of a single tuple. Regarding the second
question, we provide both positive and negative results. On the pos-
itive side, we show that adding a random-sampling pre-processing
step to a differentially-private algorithm can greatly amplify the
level of privacy protection. Hence, when given a dataset resulted
from sampling, one can utilize a much large privacy budget. On the
negative side, any privacy notion that takes advantage of the adver-
sary’s uncertainty likely does not compose. We discuss what these
results imply in practice.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we deal with the problem of using data in a privacy-
preserving way. We consider the scenario where a trusted cura-
tor obtains a dataset by gathering private information from a large
number of respondents, and then make usage of the dataset while
protecting the privacy of respondents. The curator may learn and
release to the public statistical facts about the underlying pop-
ulation. Alternatively, the curator may publish a sanitized (or,
“anonymized”) version of the dataset so that other parties can use
the data to perform any analysis they are interested in.
This paper aims at answering the following two questions in
privacy-preserving data analysis and publishing. The first is: What
formal privacy guarantee (if any) does k-anonymization methods
provide? k-Anonymization methods have been studied extensively
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in the database community, but have been known to lack strong pri-
vacy guarantees. The second question is: How to benefit from the
adversary’s uncertainty about the data? More specifically, can we
come up a meaningful relaxation of differential privacy [8, 9] by
exploiting the adversary’s uncertainty about the dataset? We now
discuss these two motivations in more details.
The k-anonymity notion was introduced by Sweeny and Sama-
rati [30, 29, 27, 28] for privacy-preserving microdata publishing.
This notion has been very influential. Many k-anonymization
methods have been developed over the last decades; it has also
been extensively applied to other problems such as location pri-
vacy [14]. The k-anonymity notion requires that when only certain
attributes, known as quasi-identifiers (QIDs), are considered, each
tuple in a k-anonymized dataset should appear at least k times. In
this paper, we consider a version of k-anonymity which treats all
attributes as QIDs. We show that even satisfying this strong ver-
sion of k-anonymity does not protect against re-identification at-
tacks. In addition, we identify the privacy vulnerabilities of ex-
isting k-anonymization algorithms. We then define classes of k-
anonymization algorithms that are “strongly-safe” and “ǫ-safe”,
which avoid the privacy vulnerabilities of existing k-anonymization
algorithms. The question we aim to answer is whether these safe k-
anonymization methods would provide strong enough privacy guar-
antee in practice.
The notion of differential privacy was introduced by Dwork et
al. [8, 11]. An algorithm A satisfies ǫ-Differential Privacy (ǫ-DP)
if and only if for any two neighboring datasets D and D′, the dis-
tributions of A(D) and A(D′) differ at most by a multiplicative
factor of eǫ. A relaxed version of ǫ-DP, which we use (ǫ, δ)-DP to
denote, allows an error probability bounded by δ. Satisfying differ-
ential privacy ensures that even if the adversary has full knowledge
of the values of a tuple t, as well as full knowledge of what other
tuples are in the dataset, and is only uncertain about whether t is
in the input dataset, the adversary cannot tell whether t is in the
dataset or not beyond a certain confidence level. As in most data
publishing scenarios, the adversary is unlikely to have precise infor-
mation about all other tuples in a dataset. It is desirable to exploit
this uncertainty to define a relaxed version of differential privacy,
which can be easier to satisfy.
We have found that sampling provides the link between our two
goals. The main result in this paper is that sampling plus “safe” k-
anonymization satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP. This result leads us to study the
relationship between sampling and differential privacy. We say that
an algorithm satisfies differential privacy under sampling if the al-
gorithm preceded with a random sampling step satisfies differential
privacy.
Results about differential privacy under sampling both are of the-
oretical interest and have practical relevance. Sampling is a natu-
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ral way to model the adversary’s uncertainty about the data; thus
this helps understand how to take advantage of this uncertainty in
private data analysis. On the practical side, many data publishing
scenarios already involve a random sampling step. Sometimes this
sampling step is explicit, when one has a large dataset and wishes
to release only a much smaller for research, such as the US census
bureau’s 1-percent Public Use Microdata Sample. Sometimes, this
sampling step is implicit; because the respondents are randomly
selected, one can view the dataset as resulted from sampling.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We prove that safe k-anonymization algorithm, when pre-
ceded by a random sampling step, provides (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy with reasonable parameters.
In the literature, k-anonymization and differential privacy
have been viewed as very different privacy guarantees: k-
anonymization is syntactic, and differential privacy is algo-
rithmic and provides semantic privacy guarantees. Our result
is, to our knowledge, the first to link k-anonymization with
differential privacy. It illustrates that “hiding in a crowd of
k” indeed offers privacy guarantees.
This result also provides a new way of satisfying differential
privacy. Existing techniques for satisfying differential pri-
vacy rely on output perturbation, that is, adding noise to the
query outputs. Our result suggests an alternative approach.
Rather than adding noise to the output, one can add a ran-
dom sampling step in the beginning and prune results that
are too sensitive to changes of individual tuples (i.e., tuples
that violate k-anonymity).
• We show both positive and negative results on utilizing the
adversary’s uncertainty about the data. On the positive side,
we show that random sampling has a privacy amplifica-
tion effect for (ǫ, δ)-DP. For an algorithm that satisfies
(ǫ, δ)-DP, adding a sampling step with probability β reduces
both eǫ − 1 and δ by a factor of β. For example, applying
an algorithm that achieves (ln 2 ≈ 0.69)-differential privacy
on dataset sampled with 0.1 probability can achieve overall
(ln 1.1 ≈ 0.095)-differential privacy.
On the negative side, we show that any privacy notion that
exploits the adversary’s uncertainty about the data is unlikely
to compose, in the sense that publishing the output from two
algorithms together may be non-private.
Our results suggest the following approaches to take advan-
tage of the fact that the input dataset is resulted from ex-
plicit or implicit sampling. If one applies algorithms that
satisfy (ǫ, δ)-DP, then one can allow a larger privacy budget
because of sampling. If one applies an algorithm that does
not satisfy (ǫ, δ)-DP, but satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP under sampling,
then it is safe to apply the algorithm once. However, if one
has a large dataset, one can repeated sample and then apply
the algorithm on each newly sampled dataset.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We study the re-
lationship between differential privacy and sampling in Section 2.
We study k-anonymization and prove our main result in Section 3.
We discuss related work in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5. An
appendix includes proofs not found in the main body.
2. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY UNDER
SAMPLING
2.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy formalizes the following protection objec-
tive: if a disclosure occurs when an individual participates in the
database, then the same disclosure also occurs with similar prob-
ability (within a small multiplicative factor) even when the indi-
vidual does not participate. More formally, differential privacy re-
quires that, given two input datasets that differ only in one tuple, the
output distributions of the algorithm on these two datasets should
be close.
DEFINITION 1. [ǫ-Differential Privacy [8, 11] (ǫ-DP)]: A ran-
domized algorithm A gives ǫ-differential privacy if for any pair of
neighboring datasets D and D′, and any O ⊆ Range(A),
Pr[A(D) ∈ O] ≤ eǫ Pr[A(D′) ∈ O] (1)
Intuitively, ǫ-DP offers strong privacy protection. If A satisfies
ǫ-DP, one can claim that publishing A(D) does not violate the
privacy of any tuple t in D, because even if one leaves t out of
the dataset, in which case the privacy of t can be considered to be
protected, one may still publish the same outputs with a similar
probability.
In practice, ǫ-DP can be too strong to satisfy in some scenarios.
A commonly used relaxation is to allow a small error probability δ.
DEFINITION 2. [(ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy [10] ((ǫ, δ)-DP)]:
A randomized algorithm A satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, if
for any pair of neighboring datasets D and D′ and for any O ⊆
Range(A):
Pr[A(D) ∈ O] ≤ eǫPr[A(D′) ∈ O] + δ
Existing methods to satisfy differential privacy includes adding
Laplace noise proportional to the query’s global sensitivity [8, 11],
adding noise related to the smooth bound of the query’s local sensi-
tivity [26], and the exponential mechanism to select a result among
all possible results [25].
2.2 Uncertain Background Knowledge
One of our goals is to develop a further relaxation of differen-
tial privacy that can be more easily satisfied. The intuition that we
wanted to exploit is the adversary’s uncertainty about the under-
lying dataset. The (ǫ, δ)-DP notion ensures that when an adver-
sary is uncertain about whether one tuple t is present in the input
dataset, even when the adversary knows the precise information all
other tuples in the input dataset, the adversary cannot tell based on
the output whether t is in the input or not. We believe that it is
reasonable to relax the assumption to that the adversary knows all
attributes of a tuple t (but not whether t is in the dataset), and in
addition statistical information about the rest of the dataset D. The
privacy notion should prevent such an adversary from substantially
distinguishing between D and D ∪ {t} based on the output.
The desire to exploit adversary’s uncertainty is shared by other
researchers. For example, Adam Smith’s blog post summarizing
the Workshop on Statistical and Learning-Theoretic Challenges in
Data Privacy includes a section on relaxed definitions of privacy
with meaningful semantics: “it would be nice to see meaningful
definitions of privacy in statistical databases that exploit the adver-
sary’s uncertainty about the data. The normal approach to this is to
specify a set of allowable prior distributions on the data (from the
adversary’s point of view). However, one has to be careful. The
versions I have seen are quite brittle.”1
9 1http://adamdsmith.wordpress.com/2010/03/04/ipam-
workshop-wrap-up/
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Some degree of brittleness may be unavoidable. It appears that
any privacy notion that takes advantage of the adversary’s uncer-
tainty about the data is not robust under composition, which re-
quires that given two algorithms that both satisfy the privacy no-
tion, their composition, i.e., applying both algorithms to the same
input dataset and then publish both outputs, also satisfies the pri-
vacy notion.
Consider the following two algorithms. Let r(D) be the predi-
cate that D contains an odd number of tuples, and s(D) be a sen-
sitive predicate, e.g., whether a tuple t is in D. Algorithm A1(D)
outputs r(D), and A2(D) outputs r(D) XOR s(D). Both A1 and
A2 should satisfy a privacy notion that assumes that the adversary
is uncertain about the data, because there is no reason that the ad-
versary should know the exact number of the tuples. However, the
composition of A1 and A2 leaks r(D). More generally, for any
privacy definition that exploits the adversary’s uncertainty about
data, there exists at least one predicate that the adversary is uncer-
tain about. Then one algorithm can output that predicate, and a
second algorithm can output that predicate XOR’s with a predicate
that results in privacy leakage; and they does not compose.
The above observation suggests that no such definition should
be used in the interactive setting of answering multiple queries. If,
however, one intends to publish a dataset in the non-interactive set-
ting only once, then the inability to compose may be an acceptable
limitation.
2.3 Differential Privacy under Sampling
One natural approach to capturing the adversary’s uncertainty
about the input data is to add a sampling step. We introduce the fol-
lowing definition, called (β, ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy under Sam-
pling ((β, ǫ, δ)-DPS for short).
DEFINITION 3 (DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY UNDER SAMPLING).
An algorithm A gives (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS if and only if β > δ and the
algorithm Aβ gives (ǫ, δ)-DP, where Aβ denotes the algorithm
to first sample with probability β (include each tuple in the input
dataset with probability β), and then apply A to the sampled
dataset.
The above definition requires β > δ because any algorithm triv-
ially satisfies (β, 0, δ)-DPS when β ≤ δ. This is because when
two datasets differ only by one tuple, sampling from them with the
probability β will result in exactly the same output with probabil-
ity 1 − β. However, when β ≫ δ, the notion of (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS is
both nontrivial to satisfy and a nontrivial relaxation of (ǫ, δ)-DP,
as shown by our results in Section 3. There we show that existing
k-anonymization algorithms do not satisfy (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS, and have
privacy vulnerabilities, and that safe (and possibly deterministic)
k-anonymization satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS, while violating (ǫ, δ)-DP
for any δ < 1.
2.4 The Amplification Effect of Sampling
An interesting feature of the (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS notion is that there is
a connection between the privacy parameters ǫ, δ and the sampling
rate β. The following theorem shows that by employing a smaller
sampling rate, one can achieve a stronger privacy protection (i.e.,
smaller values for ǫ and δ).
THEOREM 1. Any algorithm that satisfies (β1, ǫ1, δ1)-DPS
also satisfies (β2, ǫ2, δ2)-DPS for any β2 < β1, where
ǫ2 = ln
(
1 +
(
β2
β1
(eǫ1 − 1)
))
, and δ2 = β2β1 δ1.
See Appendix A.1 for the proof.
β eǫ ǫ δ
1 11 ln 11 ≈ 2.40 10−5
0.1 2 ln 2 ≈ 0.69 10−6
0.01 1.1 ln 1.1 ≈ 0.095 10−7
β ǫ
1 1
0.1 0.159
0.01 0.017
Table 1: Effect of privacy parameters under sampling.
An equivalent way to write ǫ2 = ln
(
1 +
(
β2
β1
(eǫ1 − 1)
))
is
eǫ2 − 1
eǫ1 − 1
=
β2
β1
.
In other words, by decreasing the sampling probability, one obtains
proportional decreases in eǫ − 1 and δ, improving the privacy pro-
tection. Hence, when one possesses a randomly sampled dataset,
then one can use much relaxed privacy budget ǫ and error tolera-
tion δ. To see the effects of this, in Table 1 we show the privacy
parameters for an algorithm that satisfies (ln 11, 10−5)-DP, and an
algorithm that satisfies (1, 0)-DP under sampling rate 0.1 and 0.01.
Smith’s blog 2 includes an “amplification” lemma for differential
privacy, which was used implicitly in the design of a PAC learner
for the parity class in [17]. The lemma states that an algorithm that
satisfies (ǫ = 1)-DP, when preceded by random sampling with rate
β, satisfies (2β)-DP. Theorem 1 exploits similar observations, but
is more general in that it applies to (ǫ, δ)-DP, rather than ǫ-DP, and
that it also applies to arbitrary values of ǫ. Our result is also slightly
tighter; for example, for the special case of ǫ = 1 and β = 0.1, we
give a result of 0.159 as opposed to 2β = 0.2.
2.5 Properties of (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS
While the (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS notion does not compose. It does have
several other desirable properties. In [19], Kifer and Lin identi-
fied two privacy axioms when they defined the generic differential
privacy. The Transformation Invariance axiom states that given
an algorithm A that satisfies a privacy notion, adding any post-
processing step operating on A’s output should still satisfy the pri-
vacy notion. The Privacy Axiom of Choice axiom states that given
two algorithms A1 and A2 that both satisfy a privacy notion, then
a new algorithm that chooses A1 with probability p and A2 with
probability 1− p should also satisfy the notion. We now show that
(β, ǫ, δ)-DPS satisfies both axioms.
THEOREM 2. GivenA1 that satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS and any al-
gorithm A2, A(D) = A2(A1(D)) satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS.
PROOF. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that A(D) does
not satisfy (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS, then there exist neighboring D and D′
and O ⊆ Range(A2) such that
Pr[A2(A
β
1 (D)) ∈ O] > e
ǫ Pr[A2(A
β
1 (D
′)) ∈ O] + δ
Consider all S’s in Range(A1), let q(S) = Pr[A2(S) ∈ O],
and let p(S) = Pr[Aβ1 (D) = S] and p′(S) = Pr[A
β
1 (D
′) = S].
Then we have∑
S∈Range(A1)
p(S)q(S) > eǫ
∑
S∈Range(A1)
p′(S)q(S) + δ.
We partition Range(A1) into S1 = {S | p(S) > eǫp′(S)} and
S2 = {S | p(S) ≤ e
ǫp′(S)}. Rewriting the above inequality, we
9 2http://adamdsmith.wordpress.com/2009/09/02/sample-
secrecy/
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have ∑
S∈S1
p(S)q(S) +
∑
S∈S2
p(S)q(S)
> eǫ
∑
S∈S1
p′(S)q(S) + eǫ
∑
S∈S2
p′(S)q(S) + δ
Consider the sum over S2, we have∑
S∈S2
p(S)q(S) ≤ eǫ
∑
S∈S2
p′(S)q(S)
Subtracting the above from previous, we have∑
S∈S1
p(S)q(S) > eǫ
∑
S∈S1
p′(S)q(S) + δ
For each S ∈ S1, we have p(S)(1− q(S)) > eǫp′(S)(1− q(S)),
and thus∑
S∈S1
p(S)(1− q(S)) > eǫ
∑
S∈S1
p′(S)(1− q(S))
Summing up the above two inequalities, we have∑
S∈S1
p(S) > eǫ
∑
S∈S1
p′(S) + δ
This contradicts that A1 satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS.
THEOREM 3. Given two algorithms A1 and A2 that both sat-
isfy (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS, for any p ∈ [0, 1], let Ap(D) be the algorithm
that outputs A1(D) with probability p andA2(D) with probability
1− p, then Ap satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS.
PROOF. Since both A1 and A2 satisfy (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS, for
any pair of neighboring datasets D and D′ and for any O ∈
Range(A1) ∪ Range(A2), we have
Pr[Ap(D) ∈ O]
= pPr[A1(D) ∈ O] + (1− p)Pr[A2(D) ∈ O]
≤ p(eǫ Pr[A1(D
′) ∈ O] + δ) + (1− p)(eǫ Pr[A2(D
′) ∈ O] + δ)
= eǫ(pPr[A1(D
′) ∈ O] + (1− p)Pr[A2(D
′) ∈ O]) + δ
= eǫ Pr[Ap(D
′) ∈ O] + δ.
Therefore, the algorithm Ap also satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS.
2.6 More Non-Composability
From observations in Section 2.2, we expect that (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS
does not compose. However, one would expect that combin-
ing an algorithm that satisfies (β, ǫ1, δ)-DPS and one that satis-
fies ǫ2-DP should result in an algorithm that satisfies the weaker
(β, ǫ, δ)-DPS, where ǫ is some function of ǫ1 and ǫ2. Such a
weaker form of composability is useful in that given a dataset that is
resulted from random sampling, one can publish it in a way that sat-
isfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS, while at the same time answering queries us-
ing mechanisms that satisfy ǫ-DP. Surprisingly, even such a weak
form of composability does not hold.
Consider the following two algorithms operating on datasets in
which each tuple has two fields: gender and name. Let r(D) be
the predicate that D contains more male than female, and s(D) be
a sensitive predicate, such as whether D contains a specific tuple.
The algorithmA1(D) outputs r(D) XOR s(D) when D contains a
sufficient number of tuples (say, 1000), and outputs false otherwise.
And A2(D) outputs the percentage of tuples in D that are male
with Laplacian noise [11].
Clearly A2(D) satisfies ǫ-DP. A1 satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS for
any β that is not too close to 1. Let T and T ′ be the random vari-
ables resulted from sampling from D and D′ respectively. Only
when the dataset size is large enough, would A1 output informa-
tion that depends on the input data. When D and D′ contain a large
number of tuples and differ only by one, r(T ) and r(T ′) have es-
sentially the same distribution, taking the value true with probabil-
ity very close to 0.5, making A1(T ) and A1(T ′) having a similar
distribution. Combining A1 and A2, however, is non-private. Us-
ing A2(T ) one obtains a highly accurate estimate of the predicate
r(T ), enabling the adversary to learn s(T ) with high probability.
More specifically, let D and D′ be two datasets such that s(D)
is false, s(D′) is true (i.e., D′ contains the tuple we are checking),
and they each contain 10,000 tuples, half male and half female.
Consider sampling probability β = 0.5, and the event that A1 out-
puts false, and A2 outputs p ≥ 0.5. Let T and T ′ be the random
variables resulted from sampling from D and D′ respectively, then
we have
Pr[s(T ) = true] = 0
Pr[s(T ′) = true] = 1/2
Pr[r(T ) = true | A2(T ) ≥ 0.5] ≈ 1,
Pr[r(T ′) = true | A2(T ′) ≥ 0.5] ≈ 1
and
Pr[A2(T ) ≥ 0.5 ∧ A1(T ) = false]
= Pr[A2(T ) ≥ 0.5] Pr[r(T ) = s(T ) | A2(T ) ≥ 0.5]
≈ Pr[A2(T ) ≥ 0.5] Pr[s(T ) = true]
= 0,
while
Pr[A2(T
′) ≥ 0.5 ∧A1(T
′) = false]
≈ Pr[A2(T
′) ≥ 0.5] Pr[s(T ′) = true | A2(T ′) ≥ 0.5]
= Pr[A2(T
′) ≥ 0.5] Pr[s(T ′) = true]
≈ 1/4.
This result is somewhat surprising. After all, any mechanism
that satisfies ǫ-DP should not be leaking private information about
the underlying datasets. How could adding a differentially private
mechanism destroys the privacy protection of another mechanism?
Our understanding is that satisfying (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS can be achieved
by relying on the adversary’s uncertainty. The adversary knows
only that the dataset is from a large set of candidates. While ǫ-DP
ensures that adjacent datasets are difficult to distinguish, these can-
didates are not all adjacent and can indeed be quite far apart. Hence
obtaining one ǫ-DP answer may dramatically change the probabil-
ity of which candidates are possible, removing some degree of un-
certainty, destroying any privacy protection that relies on exactly
that uncertainty.
This inability for a (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS mechanism to compose with a
ǫ-DP mechanism suggests that (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS mechanisms should
be applied alone. Hence they are not suitable for the interactive
mode, but only suitable for the non-interactive mode of data pub-
lishing. Furthermore, it also suggests that mechanisms satisfying
ǫ-DP should be used carefully as well, as its output may break
other mechanisms’ (albeit weaker) privacy guarantees.
2.7 Benefiting from Sampling
We observe that in many data publishing scenarios, random sam-
pling is an inherent step. For example, the census bureau publishes
a 1-percent microdata sample. In many research settings (such as
when Netflix wants to publishing movie ratings), it is sufficient to
publish a random sample of the dataset. Many times, even when
the dataset is not the result of explicit sampling, one can view it
as result of implicit sampling, because the process of selecting re-
spondents involves randomness.
The natural question is how one can benefit from such ex-
plicit or implicit sampling. Our results provide the following an-
swers. The first way is to limit oneself to mechanisms that satisfy
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(ǫ, δ)-DP, then the uncertainty resulted from sampling enables one
to use a larger privacy budget because of the amplification result
in Theorem 1. The second way is to use a mechanism that does
not satisfy (ǫ, δ)-DP, but satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS, such as safe k-
anonymization, which we will study in Section 3. However, this
way of benefiting from sampling can be enjoyed only once; one
cannot use the same dataset to answer other queries, even when
using mechanisms that satisfy ǫ-DP.
There, however, does exist a more flexible way to use a mech-
anism that satisfies only (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS. When one has a large
dataset, one can sample a dataset, apply the mechanism, publish
the result, and discard the intermediate sampled dataset. Because
of the composability of (ǫ, δ)-DP, this approach can be applied
multiple times so long as each time one performs a fresh sampling.
One can also use multiple mechanisms that satisfy (ǫ, δ)-DP on a
newly sampled dataset.
We point out that the benefit of sampling should not be viewed
as just “throwing away data”; sampling’s main benefit is to intro-
duce uncertainty. Given a dataset, one could sample with, say,
β = 0.2 for many (say, 50) times, and apply a mechanism that
satisfies (0.2, 0.02, 0)-DPS to each sampled dataset and publish
the results. With high probability, each tuple is included in at least
one of the sampled datasets. That is, in some sense, no tuple is
thrown away. However, as each sampling and publishing satisfies
(ǫ, δ)-DP, and (ǫ, δ)-DP composes, publishing the 50 outputs still
satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP for ǫ = 1, δ = 0.
In summary, sampling creates uncertainty for the adversary.
While the benefit due to this uncertainty is easy to lose because
the uncertainty can be jeopardized by answering any query on it,
this uncertainty is also easy to gain, as each sampling introduces
fresh uncertainty.
3. SAFE K-ANONYMIZATION MEETS
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section we show that k-anonymization, when per-
formed in a “safe” way, satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS. That is, safe k-
anonymization, when preceded by a random sampling step, satis-
fies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
3.1 An Analysis of k-Anonymity
The development of k-anonymity was motivated by a well pub-
licized privacy incident [30]. The Group Insurance Commission
(GIC) published a supposedly anonymized dataset recording the
medical visits of patients managed under its insurance plan. While
the obvious personal identifiers (such as name and address) were re-
moved, the published data included zip code, date of birth, and gen-
der, which are sufficient to uniquely identify a significant fraction
of the population. Sweeney [30] showed that by correlating this
data with the publicly available Voter Registration List for Cam-
bridge Massachusetts, medical visits for many individuals can be
easily identified, including those of William Weld, a former gov-
ernor of Massachusetts. We note that even without access to the
public voter registration list, the same privacy breaches can occur.
Many individuals’ birthdate, gender and zip code are public infor-
mation. This is especially the case with the advent of social media,
including Facebook, where users share seemingly innocuous per-
sonal information to the public. The GIC re-identification attack
directly motivated the development of the k-anonymity privacy no-
tion.
DEFINITION 4. [k-Anonymity, the privacy notion] [30]: A
published table satisfies k-anonymity relative to a set of QID at-
tributes if and only if when the table is projected to include only the
QIDs, every tuple appears at least k times.
Quasi-identifiers vs. Sensitive Attributes? A first problem
with Definition 4 is that it requires the division of all attributes
into quasi-identifiers (QIDs) and sensitive attributes (SA), where
the adversary is assumed to know the QIDs, but not SAs. This sep-
aration, however, is very hard to obtain in practice. Even though
only some attributes are used in the GIC incident, it is difficult to
assume that they are the only QIDs. Other attributes in the GIC
data include visit date, diagnosis, etc. There may well exist an ad-
versary who knows this information about some individuals, and if
with this knowledge these individuals’ record can be re-identified,
it is still a serious privacy breach.
The same difficulty is true for publishing any kind of census,
medical, or transactional data. When publishing anonymized mi-
crodata, one has to defend against all kinds of adversaries, some
know one set of attributes, and others know different sets. An at-
tribute about one individual may be known by some adversaries,
and unknown (and should be considered sensitive) for other adver-
saries.
Any separation between QIDs and SAs is essentially making as-
sumptions about the adversary’s background knowledge that can
be easily violated, rendering any privacy protection invalid. Hence
we consider a strengthened version of k-anonymity by treating all
attributes as QIDs. This is stronger than using any subset of at-
tributes as QIDs. This strengthened version of k-anonymity avoids
making assumption about the adversary’s background knowledge
about which attributes are known and what are not. This has been
used in the context of anonymizing transaction data [16].
Weakness of the k-Anonymity Notion. With the strengthened
version of k-anonymity, one might expect that it should stop re-
identification attacks. To satisfy this notion, each tuple in the out-
put is blended in a group of at least k tuples that are the same.
This follows the appealing principle that “privacy means hiding in
a crowd”. The intuition is that as there are at least k−1 other tuples
that look exactly the same, one cannot re-identify which tuple in the
output corresponds to an individual with probability over 1/k. Un-
fortunately, this intuition turns out to be wrong. Only making the
syntactic requirement that each tuple appears at least k times does
not protect privacy, as a trivial way to satisfy this is to select some
tuples from the input and then duplicate each of them k times.
Several other privacy notions have been introduced on the mo-
tivation that k-anonymity is not strong enough. Among these are
ℓ-diversity [23] and t-closeness [22]. In these approaches, it is ob-
served that even if k-anonymity is achieved, information about sen-
sitive attributes can still be learned, perhaps due to the uneven dis-
tribution of their values. This line of work, however, still requires
the problematic assumption that there is a separation between QIDs
and SAs, and that the adversary knows only the QIDs. In other
words, while they correctly assert that k-anonymity is not strong
enough, these definitions did not fix it in the right way.
k-Anonymity vs. k-Anonymization Algorithms. Here we would
like to make a clear distinction between the k-anonymity, the pri-
vacy notion, and k-anonymization algorithms.
Many k-anonymization algorithms have been developed in the
literature. Given input datasets, they aim at producing anonymized
versions of the input datasets that satisfy k-anonymity. That the
k-anonymity privacy notion is weak means that producing outputs
that satisfying k-anonymity alone is insufficient for privacy pro-
tection. However, this does not automatically mean that all k-
anonymization have privacy vulnerabilities. We now show that
the algorithms that have been developed in the literature are in-
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deed vulnerable to re-identification attacks. Consider the follow-
ing anonymization scheme, which represents several proposed al-
gorithms for k-anonymity [5, 21].
ALGORITHM 1. [Clustering and Local Recoding (CLR)]:
First, group input tuples into clusters such that each cluster has
at least k tuples. For example, one method of grouping is the Mon-
drian algorithm [21]. One could also use some clustering method
based on some distance measurement (e.g., [5]). Then, for each
tuple, replace each attribute value with a generalized value that
represents all values for that attribute in the cluster.
CLR algorithms are vulnerable when some tuples contain ex-
treme values. Even if the output satisfies k-anonymity, the gener-
alized value depends on the extreme values of some tuples; hence
from the output an adversary can infer that one’s tuple is in the
dataset and can thus infer these values. For example, suppose
the dataset records the net worth of some individuals in a town.
Further suppose that it is known that only one individual in the
town has net worth over $10 million. When given a (k = 20)-
anonymized output dataset containing one group of tuples that all
have [900K, 35M ] as the generalized net worth value, what can
one conclude? At least the following: the rich individual is in the
dataset; the individual’s tuple is in the group; and the individual’s
net worth is $35 million. It would be difficult to say that because in
the output dataset, there are at least 19 other tuples that are exactly
the same, then the individual cannot be re-identified with probabil-
ity 1/20.
Similar weaknesses exist for other k-anonymization algorithm
in the literature, for example, those computing a generalization
scheme based on the input dataset [16]. With all these algorithms,
the presence and non-presence of some extreme values will affect
the resulted generalization scheme, leaking information.
As these algorithms are sensitive to the presence of a single tuple
with extreme values, they do not satisfy (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS when β > δ,
since sampling with β will result the presence of the tuple selected
with probability β.
3.2 Towards “Safe” k-Anonymization
We have shown that k-anonymity (even when all attributes are
treated as QID) does not provide adequate protection, nor do ex-
isting k-anonymization algorithms. One natural question is: Is this
because the intuition “hidden in a crowd” fails to provide privacy
protection, or is it because the definition of k-anonymity fails to
correctly capture “hidden in a crowd”?
We believe that the answer is the latter. The notion of k-
anonymity implicitly assumes that there is a one-to-one relation g
between the input tuples and the output tuples, i.e., given input D,
the output dataset is {g(t) | t ∈ D}. When there are k output tu-
ples that are the same, there must exist k input tuples that are indis-
tinguishable based only on their corresponding outputs. However,
this relation g itself can be overly dependent on one or a few input
tuples. For instance, consider the example above with the extreme
value. Choosing [900K, 35M ] as the generalized value depends on
the single input tuple with value 35M ; hence all tuples that contain
this generalized value are directly affected by one tuple’s presence,
and the tuple is not really “hiding in a crowd”.
An intriguing question is: If a k-anonymization algorithm uses a
mapping that does not overly depend on any individual tuple, does
such an algorithm provide an adequate level of privacy protection?
To answer this question, we first formalize such algorithms as safe
k-Anonymization algorithms.
Intuitively, an k-anonymization algorithm A takes as input a
dataset D and a value k and produces an output dataset S = A(D).
In order to define “safe” anonymization algorithms, we require
each anonymization algorithm A to be specified in two steps. The
first step, Am, outputs a mapping function g : D → T , where T is
the set of all possible tuples. The second step applies g to all tuples
in D. That is, A(D, k) = Apply(Am(D, k), D, k), where Apply
is defined as follows.
Apply(g,D, k)
S ← ∅
for all t ∈ D do
S ← S ∪ g(t)
end for
for all s ∈ S do
if s appears less than k times in S then
remove all occurrences of s from S
end if
end for
return S
We note that all existing k-anonymization algorithms can be
modeled this way, as there is no limitation on the the form of Am’s
output g. In the extreme case, g can be described as a table match-
ing each tuple in D to the desired output tuple.
DEFINITION 5 (STRONGLY-SAFE ANONYMIZATION). We
say that a k-anonymization algorithmA is strongly safe if and only
if the function Am(D, k) is remains constant when D changes,
i.e., the mapping g does not depend on its input dataset.
An example of a strongly-safe k-anonymization algorithm is to
always use the same global recoding scheme no matter what dataset
is the input.
Intuitively a strongly-safe k-anonymization algorithm provides
some level of privacy protection, and the level of privacy protec-
tion increases with larger values of k. If any individual’s tuple is
published, there must exist at least k − 1 other tuples in the input
database that are the same under the recoding scheme; furthermore,
the recoding scheme does not depend on the dataset, and one sees
only the results of the recoding. Hence in this input dataset, the in-
dividual is hidden in a crowd of at least k. However, the following
proposition shows that strongly safe k-anonymization algorithms
do not satisfy (ǫ, δ)-DP.
PROPOSITION 4. No strongly-safe k-anonymization algorithm
satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP for any δ < 1.
PROOF. Given a strongly-safe algorithm A, let g be the map-
pingA uses. Choose D and D′ that differ in one tuple t and D con-
tains n > k tuples t′ such that g(t′) = g(t). The dataset D′ con-
tains n−1 copies of such t′. Then,A(D) andA(D′) contain differ-
ent numbers of g(t). Let S = A(D), we have Pr[A(D) = S] = 1
and Pr[A(D′) = S] = 0.
3.3 Privacy of Strongly-Safe k-
Anonymization
We now show that strongly-safe k-anonymization algorithm sat-
isfies (β, ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for a small δ with reasonable val-
ues of k and β. We use f(j;n, β) to denote the probability mass
function for the binomial distribution; that is, f(j;n, β) gives the
probability of getting exactly j successes in n trials where each
trial succeeds with probability β. And we use F (j;n, β) to de-
note the cumulative probability mass function; that is, F (j;n, β) =∑j
i=0 f(i;n, β).
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THEOREM 5. Any strongly-safe k-anonymization algorithm
satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS for any 0 < β < 1, ǫ ≥ − ln(1 − β),
and δ = d(k, β, ǫ), where the function d is defined as
d(k, β, ǫ) = max
n:n≥
⌈
k
γ
−1
⌉
n∑
j>γn
f(j;n, β),
where γ = (e
ǫ−1+β)
eǫ
.
See Appendix A.2 for the proof.
The function d relates the four parameters ǫ, β, k, δ by requiring
δ = d(k, β, ǫ). Note that the other requirement is that ǫ ≥ − ln(1−
β). Among the four parameters, ǫ and δ define the level of privacy
protection, while k and β affect the quality of anonymized data.
We now examine the relationships among these four parameters.
To compute this, we want to find n ≥
⌈
k
γ
− 1
⌉
that maximizes∑n
j>γn f(j;n, β). We first observe that γ > β because
γ − β = (e
ǫ−1+β)
eǫ
− β = (e
ǫ−1)(1−β)
eǫ
> 0
That is,
∑n
j>γn f(j; n, β) sums up the tail binomial distribution
probabilities for the portion of the tail beyond γn, as shown in Fig-
ure 1. Following the intuition behind the law of large numbers, the
larger the value of n, the smaller this tail probability. Hence intu-
itively, choosing the smallest value of n, i.e., n = nm =
⌈
k
γ
− 1
⌉
should maximize the formula. Unfortunately, due to the discrete
nature of the binomial distribution, the maximum value may not be
reached at nm, but instead at one of the next few local maximal
points
⌈
k+1
γ
− 1
⌉
,
⌈
k+2
γ
− 1
⌉
, · · · . Thus we are unable to further
simplify the representation of the function d(k, β, ǫ).
We now report the relationships among ǫ, β, k, δ using numerical
computation. In Table 2, we fix k = 20 and report the values of δ
under different ǫ and β values. The table shows that the values of δ
can be very small. We note that with fixed k and β, δ decreases as ǫ
increases, which states that the error probability gets smaller when
one relaxes the ǫ-bound on the probability ratio. In other words,
the more serious a privacy breach, the more unlikely it occurs. The
table also shows that with fixed k and ǫ, δ decreases as β decreases,
meaning that a smaller sampling probability improves the privacy
protection.
In Figure 2, we show the results from examining the relationship
between ǫ and δ when we vary k ∈ {5, 10, 20, 30, 50} under fixed
β = 0.2. We plot 1
δ
against ǫ for values of ǫ > − ln(1− β). The
figure indicates a negative correlation between ǫ and δ. Further-
more, increasing k has a close to exponential effect of improving
privacy protection. For example, when ǫ = 2, increasing k by 10
roughly decreases δ by 10−5.
In Figure 3, we show the results from examining the effect
of varying β ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4} under a fixed value of
k = 20. This shows that decreasing β also dramatically improve
the privacy protection. The two figures indicate the intricate rela-
tionship between privacy and utility.
In Figure 4, we explore this phenomenon that increasing k and
decreasing β both improve privacy protection. Starting from (k =
15, β = 0.05), each time we double β and find a value k that gives
a similar level of privacy protection. We finds that k increases from
15 to 22 (for β = 0.1), 35 (for β = 0.2), and 60 (for β = 0.4).
In Figure 5, we examine the quality of privacy protection for very
small k’s (from 1 to 5). We choose a very small sampling proba-
bility of β = 0.025. Not surprisingly, when k = 1, the privacy
protection is entirely from the sampling effect, as the obtained δ
value is less than β. However, when k ≥ 2, we start seeing privacy
βn γn
Figure 1: A graph showing the relationship between βn and γn
on a binomial curve
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Figure 2: A graph showing the relationship between ǫ and 1
δ
if
we vary the values of k under fixed β
protection effect from k-anonymization, with δ (< 0.001) signifi-
cantly smaller than β = 0.025 when ǫ = 2.
Finally, in Figure 6 we show the relationship between the privacy
parameter ǫ and the utility parameter k if we set the requirement
that δ ≤ 10−6. The figure shows that smaller values of ǫ can be
satisfied for larger values of k. Furthermore, the effect of β over ǫ
is quite substantial.
3.4 ǫ-Safe k-Anonymization
In practice, requiring a k-anonymization algorithm to be strongly
safe is likely to result in outputs that have low utility. We now relax
this requirement to allow the generalization scheme to be chosen in
a way that depends on the input dataset, but does not overly depend
on any individual tuple.
DEFINITION 6 (ǫ-SAFE k-ANONYMIZATION). We say that a
k-anonymization algorithm A is ǫ-safe if and only if the function
Am satisfies ǫ-DP.
One possible approach to do this is to consider various possible
generalization schemes, uses a quality function to assign a quality
to each of them, and then uses the exponential mechanism [25] to
select in a differentially private way a generalization scheme that
gives good utility.
7
ǫβ
0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.5 2.0
0.05 6.83×10−10 2.50×10−14 3.19×10−17 1.76×10−19 3.97×10−22 2.00×10−24
0.1 4.19×10−06 1.61×10−09 3.44×10−12 4.07×10−14 3.22×10−16 1.89×10−18
0.2 2.16×10−03 8.02×10−06 1.89×10−07 6.03×10−09 4.79×10−11 1.59×10−12
Table 2: A table showing the relationship between β and ǫ in determining the value of δ when k is fixed. In the above k = 20, and
each cell in the table reports the value of δ under the given values of β and ǫ
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k = 20, β = 0.05
k = 20, β = 0.1
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k = 20, β = 0.4
Figure 3: A graph showing the relationship between ǫ and 1
δ
if
we vary the values of β under fixed k.
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Figure 4: A graph showing the relationship between the values
of k needed to achieve roughly the same δ if we double β.
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Figure 5: A graph showing the relationship between ǫ and 1
δ
with small k’s, varying k and fixing β.
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Figure 6: A graph showing the value of ǫ satisfied by a given k
if δ ≤ 10−6 with varying sampling probabilities.
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The following theorem shows that ǫ-safe k-Anonymization also
satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS.
THEOREM 6. Any ǫ1-safe k-anonymization algorithm satisfies
(β, ǫ, δ)-DPS, where ǫ ≥ − ln(1−β)+ ǫ1, δ = d(k, β, ǫ− ǫ1) =
max
n:n≥⌈ k
γ
−1⌉
∑n
j>γn f(j;n, β), γ =
(eǫ−ǫ1−1+β)
eǫ−ǫ1
.
See Appendix A.3 for the proof.
3.5 Remarks of the Result
Theorems 5 and 6 show that k-anonymization, when done
safely, and when preceded by a random sampling step, can sat-
isfy (ǫ, δ)-DP with reasonable parameters. In the literature, k-
anonymization and differential privacy have been viewed as very
different privacy guarantees. k-anonymization achieves weak syn-
tactic privacy, and differential privacy provides strong semantic pri-
vacy guarantees. Our result is, to our knowledge, the first to link
k-anonymization with differential privacy. This suggests that the
“hiding in a crowd of k” privacy principle indeed offers some pri-
vacy guarantees when used correctly. We note that this principle is
used widely in contexts other than privacy-preserving publishing of
relational data, including location privacy and publishing of social
network data, network packets, and other types of data.
We also observe that another way to interpret our result is that
this provides a new method of satisfying (ǫ, δ)-DP. Existing meth-
ods for satisfying differential privacy include adding noise accord-
ing to the global sensitivity [8], adding noise according to the
smooth local sensitivity [26], and the exponential mechanism [25]
which directly assigns probabilities to each possible answer in the
range. Our result suggests an alternative approach: Rather than
adding noises to the output, one can add a random sampling step in
the beginning and prune results that are too sensitive to changes of
a single individual tuple (i.e., tuples that violate k-anonymity). In
other words, when the dataset is resulted from random sampling,
then one can answer count queries accurately provided that the re-
sult is large enough. An intriguing question is whether other input
perturbation techniques can be used to satisfy differential privacy
as well.
4. RELATED WORK
A lot of work on privacy-preserving data publishing considers
privacy notions that are weaker than differential privacy. These ap-
proaches typically assume an adversary that knows only some as-
pects of the dataset (background knowledge) and tries to prevent it
from learning some other aspects. One can always attack such a pri-
vacy notion by changing either what the adversary already knows,
or changing what the adversary tries to learn. The most prominent
among these notions is k-anonymity [30, 29]. Some follow-up no-
tions include l-diversity [23] and t-closeness [22]. In this paper, we
analyze the weaknesses of k-anonymity in detail, and argue that a
separation between QIDs and sensitive attributes are difficult to ob-
tain in practice, challenging the foundation of privacy notions such
as l-diversity, t-closeness, and other ones centered on attribute dis-
closure prevention.
The notion of differential privacy was developed in a series of
works [7, 13, 3, 11, 8]. It represents a major breakthrough in
privacy-preserving data analysis. In an attempt to make differen-
tial privacy more amenable to more sensitive queries, several relax-
ations have been developed, including (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [7,
13, 3, 11]. Three basic general approaches to achieve differential
privacy are adding Laplace noise proportional to the query’s global
sensitivity [8, 11], adding noise related to the smooth bound of the
query’s local sensitivity [26], and the exponential mechanism to
select a result among all possible results [25]. A survey on these
results can be found in [9]. Our approach suggests an alterative
by using input perturbation rather than output perturbation to add
uncertainty to the adversary’s knowledge of the data.
Random sampling [1, 2] has been studied as a method for pri-
vacy preserving data mining, where privacy notions other than dif-
ferential privacy were used. The relationship between sampling
and differential privacy has been explored before. Chauduri and
Mishra [6] studied the privacy effect of sampling, and showed a
linear relationship between the sampling probability and the error
probability δ. Their result suggests an approach to perform first
k-anonymization and then sampling as the last step. We instead
consider the approach of perform sampling as the first step and
then k-anonymization. Our result suggests that the latter approach
benefits much more from the sampling.
There exists some work on publishing microdata while satisfy
(ǫ, δ)-DP or its variant. Machanavajjhala et al. [24] introduced a
variant of (ǫ, δ)-DP called (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy
and showed that it is satisfied by a synthetic data generation method
for the problem of releasing the commuting patterns of the popu-
lation in the United States. This notion is stronger than (ǫ, δ)-DP.
Korolova et al. [20] considered publishing search queries and clicks
that achieves (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. A similar approach for re-
leasing query logs with differential privacy was proposed by Götz
et al. [15]. These approaches apply the output perturbation tech-
nique in differential privacy to microdata publishing scenarios that
can be reduced to histogram publishing at their core. Blum et al. [4]
and Dwork et al. [12] considered outputing synthetic data genera-
tion that is useful for a particular class of queries. These papers do
not deal with the relationship between k-anonymization and differ-
ential privacy, or between sampling and k-anonymization.
Kifer and Lin [19] developed a general framework to charac-
terize relaxation of differential privacy. They identified two axioms
for a privacy definition: Transformation Invariance and Privacy Ax-
iom of Choice, which are satisfied by (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS. They did not
consider the composability of these notions, which was our empha-
sis, as a clear understanding of the composability issues directs us
what can and cannot be done with sampled dataset.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have answered the two questions we set out in the begin-
ning of the paper. We take the approach of starting from both
k-anonymization and differential privacy and trying to meet in
the middle. On the one hand, we identify weaknesses in the k-
anonymity notion and existing k-anonymization methods and pro-
pose the notion of safe k-anonymization to avoid these privacy vul-
nerabilities. On the other hand, we try to relax differential privacy
to take advantage of the adversary’s uncertainty of the data. The
key insight underlying our results is that random sampling can be
used to bridge this gap between k-anonymization and differential
privacy.
We have explored both the power and potential pitfalls to take
advantage of sampling in private data analysis or publishing. Our
results show that sampling, when used correctly, is a powerful tool
that can greatly benefit differential privacy, as it creates uncertainty
for the adversary. Sampling can increase the privacy budget and
error toleration bound. Sampling also enables the usage of algo-
rithms such as safe k-anonymization; however, this usage requires
fresh sampling that is not used to answer any other query. An in-
triguing open question is whether there exist approaches other than
sampling that can create uncertainty for the adversary, that can tol-
erate answering ǫ-DP queries.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOFS
This appendix includes proofs not included in the main body.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. Given an algorithm A that satisfies
(β1, ǫ1, δ1)-DPS, A also satisfies (β2, ǫ2, δ2)-DPS for any
β2 < β1, where
ǫ2 = ln
(
1 +
(
β2
β1
(eǫ1 − 1)
))
and δ2 = β2β1 δ1.
PROOF. We need to show that the algorithm Aβ2 satisfies
(ǫ2, δ2)-DP. Let β = β2β1 . The algorithm A
β2 can be viewed
as first sampling with probability β, then followed by applying the
algorithm Aβ1 , which satisfies (ǫ1, δ1)-DP.
We use Λβ(D) to denote the process of sampling from D with
sampling rate β. Any pair D,D′ can be viewed as D and D−t,
where D−t denotes the dataset resulted from removing one copy
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of t from D. For any O, let
Z = Pr[Aβ2(D) ∈ O], and X = Pr[Aβ2(D−t) ∈ O],
we want to show that
(Z ≤ eǫ2X + δ2) ∧ (X ≤ e
ǫ2Z + δ2) .
We have
Z =
∑
T⊆D
Pr[Λβ(D) = T ] Pr[A
β1(T ) ∈ O],
X =
∑
T⊆D−t
Pr[Λβ(D−t) = T ] Pr[A
β1(T ) ∈ O].
To analyze Z, we note that all the T ’s that resulted from sam-
pling from D with probability β can be divided into those in which
t is not sampled, and those in which t is sampled. For a T in the
former case, we have
Pr[Λβ(D) = T ] = (1− β) Pr[Λβ(D) = T |t not sampled in T ]
= (1− β) Pr[Λβ(D−t) = T ]
For a T in the latter case, we have
Pr[Λβ(D) = T ] = β Pr[Λβ(D) = T |t sampled in T ]
= β Pr[Λβ(D−t) = T−t].
Hence we have
Z =
∑
T⊆D−t
(1 − β)Pr[Λβ(D−t) = T ] Pr[A
β1(T ) ∈ O]
+
∑
T−t⊆D−t
β Pr[Λβ(D−t) = T−t] Pr[A
β1 (T−t) ∈ O]
Let
Y =
∑
T ′⊆D−t
Pr[Λβ(D−t) = T
′] Pr[Aβ1(T ′+t) ∈ O],
then we have Z = (1− β)X + βY.
That A satisfies (β1, ǫ1, δ1)-DPS means that for each T,O
Pr[Aβ1(T+t) ∈ O] ≤ e
ǫ1 Pr[Aβ1(T ) ∈ O] + δ1
Hence we have
Y ≤
∑
T ′⊆D−t
Pr[Λβ(D−t) = T
′]
(
eǫ1 Pr[Aβ1 (T ′ ∈ O] + δ1
)
,
= eǫ1
∑
T ′⊆D−t
Pr[Λβ(D−t) = T
′] Pr[Aβ1(T ′) ∈ O]
+δ1
∑
T ′⊆D−t
Pr[Λβ(D−t) = T
′]
= eǫ1X + δ1.
Hence we have
Z = (1− β)X + βY
≤ (1− β)X + β(eǫ1X + δ1)
≤ (1− β + βeǫ1)X + βδ1.
= eǫ2X + δ2.
To show that X ≤ eǫ2Z + δ2, we observe that A satisfies
(β1, ǫ1, δ1)-DPS means that
X ≤ eǫ1Y + δ1, and hence
Z = (1− β)X + βY ≥ (1− β)X + βe−ǫ1(X − δ1),
and X ≤ 1
1− β + βe−ǫ1
Z +
βe−ǫ1
1− β + eβ−ǫ1
δ1
We now show that
1
1− β + βe−ǫ1
≤ e
ǫ2=ln
(
1+
(
β2
β1
(eǫ1−1)
))
= 1+β(eǫ1−1) = eǫ2 .
1
1−β(1−e−ǫ1 )
≤ 1 + β(eǫ1 − 1)
⇔ 0 ≤ (1 + β(eǫ1 − 1))(1− β(1− e−ǫ1))− 1
⇔ 0 ≤ (eǫ1 + e−ǫ1 − 2)(β − β2).
Hence
βe−ǫ1
1− β + eβ−ǫ1
δ1 ≤ βe
−ǫ1eǫ2δ1 ≤ βδ1 = δ2.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5: Any strongly-safe k-anonymization algorithm sat-
isfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS for any 0 < β < 1, ǫ ≥ − ln(1 − β), and
δ = d(k, β, ǫ), where the function d is defined as
d(k, β, ǫ) = max
n:n≥
⌈
k
γ
−1
⌉
n∑
j>γn
f(j;n, β),
where γ = (e
ǫ−1+β)
eǫ
.
PROOF. Let A denote the algorithm, and g be the data-
independent generalization procedure in the algorithm. For any
dataset D, any tuple t ∈ D, and for any output S. For any
ǫ ≥ − ln(1− β), we show that the probability by which
e−ǫ ≤
Pr[A(D) = S]
Pr[A(D−t) = S]
≤ eǫ (2)
is violated is δ. Note that this is a stronger version of (ǫ, δ)-DP
than the one in Definition 2. See [18] for relationship between the
two.
Let n be the number of t′ in D such that g(t′) = g(t). Let j be
the number of times that g(t) appears in S. Note that as the only
difference between D and D−t is that D has one extra copy of t,
we have.
Pr[A(D) = S]
Pr[A(D−t)) = S]
=
Pr[A(D) has j copies of g(t)]
Pr[A(D−t) has j copies of g(t)]
Because any tuple that appears less than k times is suppressed,
either j ≥ k, or j = 0. When j = 0, we have
Pr[A(D) = S]
Pr[A(D−t) = S]
=
F (k − 1;n, β)
F (k − 1;n− 1, β)
=
∑k−1
i=0 f(i;n, β)∑k−1
i=0 f(i;n− 1, β)
.
Because F (k − 1;n, β) is always less than F (k − 1;n − 1, β);3
hence Pr[A(D)=S]
Pr[A(D−t)=S]
< eǫ. Furthermore, we note that ∀i ∈ [0..k−
1], f(i;n,β)
f(i;n−1,β)
= n(1−β)
n−i
≥ (1 − β). Hence Pr[A(D)=S]
Pr[A(D−t))=S]
≥
(1− β). Because ǫ ≥ − ln(1− β), we have e−ǫ ≤ 1− β; hence
under the case when j = 0, inequality (2) is satisfied.
When j ≥ k, we have
Pr[A(D) = S]
Pr[A(D−t5)) = S]
=
f(j;n, β)
f(j;n− 1, β)
=
{
n(1−β)
n−j
n ≥ j
1 n < j.
The choice of n can be arbitrary because it is determined by the
choice of D. The value of j is determined by the choice of S. For
some values of j, inequality (2) is violated. We want to compute
the probabilities of these bad j’s occurring. From the above, we
know when j > n, the outcome is good. We now consider the bad
outcomes when j ≤ n.
9 3Let Xi’s be random variables that take the value 1 with proba-
bility β, and 0 with probability 1−β. F (k−1;n−1, β) is the prob-
ability that the sum of n−1 such X’s ≤ k−1, and F (k−1;n, β)
is the probability that the sum of n such X’s is ≤ k − 1.
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Note that because ǫ ≥ − ln(1 − β), we have −ǫ ≤ ln(1 − β),
and
n(1− β)
n− j
> 1− β ≥ e−ǫ.
Hence we only need to consider what j’s make n(1−β)
n−j
> eǫ. This
occurs when j > (e
ǫ−1+β)n
eǫ
. Let γ = (e
ǫ−1+β)
eǫ
, then this occurs
when j > γn.
So far our analysis has shown that 5a bad outcome S for an input
D would satisfy the condition j ≥ k and n ≥ j > γn. Now we
need to compute the probability that A(D) gives a bad outcome,
and the probability that A(D−t) gives a bad outcome. The former
is given below:
max
n
n∑
j:(j≥k∧j>γn)
f(j;n, β) (3)
And the latter is
max
n
n−1∑
j:(j≥k∧j>γn)
f(j;n− 1, β).
As the latter is smaller than the former, we only need to bound the
former.
Let nm =
⌈
k
γ
− 1
⌉
, we now show that when n ≤ nm,∑n
j:(j≥k∧j>γn) f(j;n, β) increases when n increases. Note
that the choice of nm satisfies the condition that γnm < k
and γ(nm + 1) ≥ k. Observe that when n ≤ nm, the
condition (j ≥ k ∧ j > γn) becomes j ≥ k. The function∑n
j:j≥k f(j;n, β) is monotonically increasing with respect to n.
When n ≥ nm, the condition (j ≥ k ∧ j > γn) becomes j >
γn. (In fact, when n = nm +1, the smallest j to satisfy j > γn is
k + 1.) Hence the error probability is bounded by
δ = d(k, β, ǫ) = max
n:n≥
⌈
k
γ
−1
⌉
n∑
j>γn
f(j;n, β), where γ =
(eǫ − 1 + β)
eǫ
.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6: Any ǫ1-safe k-anonymization algorithm satisfies
(β, ǫ, δ)-DPS, where ǫ ≥ − ln(1−β)+ ǫ1, δ = d(k, β, ǫ− ǫ1) =
max
n:n≥⌈ k
γ
−1⌉
∑n
j>γn f(j;n, β), γ =
(eǫ−ǫ1−1+β)
eǫ−ǫ1
.
PROOF. Let A denote the ǫ1-safe k-anonymization algorithm.
Here, we want to show that for any ǫ ≥ − ln(1 − β) + ǫ1, D,
t ∈ D and S,
e−ǫ ≤
Pr[A(D) = S]
Pr[A(D−t) = S]
≤ eǫ (4)
is valid for probability at least 1 − δ. Let Λβ denote the process
of binomial sampling the dataset D with probability β. And let G
denote the set of all the possible outputs ofA’s subroutineAm. By
definition, its subroutine Am satisfies ǫ1-differential privacy,
e−ǫ1 ≤
Pr[Am(D) = g]
Pr[Am(D−t) = g]
≤ eǫ1 .
And, according to the proof of Theorem 6, for a fixed g ∈ G, the
ratio r(g) = Pr[g(Λβ(D))=S]
Pr[g(Λβ(D−t))=S]
equals
r(g) =


∑k−1
i=0
f(i;n,β)
∑k−1
i=0
f(i;n−1,β)
if j = 0;
n(1−β)
n−j
if k ≤ j ≤ n
where j is the number of copies of g(t) in the output dataset S. So,
the differential privacy ratio (4) can be upper bounded,
Pr[A(D)=S]
Pr[A(D−t)=S]
=
∑
g∈G Pr[Am(D)=g]·Pr[g(Λβ(D))=S]∑
g∈G Pr[Am(D−t)=g]·Pr[g(Λβ(D−t))=S]
≤
eǫ1
∑
g∈G Pr[Am(D−t)=g]·Pr[g(Λβ(D))=S]∑
g∈G Pr[Am(D−t)=g]·Pr[g(Λβ(D−t))=S]
≤
eǫ1 r(g)
∑
g∈G Pr[Am(D−t)=g]·Pr[g(Λβ(D−t))=S]∑
g∈G Pr[Am(D−t)=g]·Pr[g(Λβ(D−t))=S]
= eǫ1r(g).
The lower bound can be obtained in a similar way. So,
e−ǫ1r(g) ≤
Pr[Aβ(D) = S]
Pr[Aβ(D−t) = S]
≤ eǫ1r(g).
By the proof of Theorem 6, the ratio r(g) is bounded by
e−(ǫ−ǫ1) ≤ r(g) ≤ e(ǫ−ǫ1). The probability that it is violated
is the probability that inequality (4) is violated. In the j = 0 case,
e−(ǫ−ǫ1) ≤
∑k−1
i=0
f(i;n,β)
∑k−1
i=0
f(i;n−1,β)
≤ e(ǫ−ǫ1), since ǫ ≥ − ln(1− β) +
ǫ1. And for the k ≤ j ≤ n case, n(1−β)n−j > (1 − β) ≥ e
−ǫ+ǫ1
.
And only when n(1−β)
n−j
> eǫ−ǫ1
(
j > n(e
ǫ−ǫ1−1+β)
eǫ−ǫ1
)
, inequality
(4) is violated. Let γ = (eǫ−ǫ1−1+β)
eǫ−ǫ1
. The error probability δ is
δ = d(k, β, ǫ − ǫ1) = max
n:n≥⌈ k
γ
−1⌉
n∑
j>γn
f(j;n, β),
where γ = (e
ǫ−ǫ1−1+β)
eǫ−ǫ1
.
12
